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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No. 
-vs- : 14300 
ROBERT MAXSON VICKERS, : 
Def endant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction by a jury trial 
of the crime of placing an infernal machine in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-307 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by jury before the Honorable 
J. Harlan Burns, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
and convicted for placing of an infernal machine in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-307 (1953), as amended. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 13, 1975, in Washington, Utah, appellant 
i 
had taken some dynamite and placed i t a t the back bumper of 
Officer P h i l l i p Hartley's automobile (T.108) . After l igh t ing 
i t , appel lant l e f t the scene, but then re turned to the scene * 
with a gun before the dynamite exploded (T.108,116). There 
was an unusual durat ion of time between when the dynamite was 
i 
l i t and when i t exploded. With unce r t a in ty , the time was 
est imated around ten minues (T.118). 
When appel lant re turned he grabbed the dynamite and | 
i t exploded (T. 108-109) . Damage to Mr. Hartley's car was in 
the amount of $975.00. There was a lso damage to the porch, 
p l a s t e r boards, shed, lawn and shrubs of a nearby home in 
the amount of $415.00 (T.22-24,28,29) . 
Appellant was charged in the information with 
placing an inferna l machine in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-307 (1953) (R.32-33). Appellant was found g u i l t y 
by a jury t r i a l as charged. ' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY VERDICT OF GUILTY OF PLACING AN INFERNAL MACHINE, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-307 (1953). 
Appellant was tried by jury and convicted for 
placing of an infernal machine in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-307 (1953), as amended, which states the 
following: 
"Every person who delivers or 
causes to be delivered to any express 
or railway company or other common 
carrier, or to any person, any infernal 
machine, knowing it to be such without 
informing the common carrier or person 
of the nature thereof, or sends it 
through the mail, or throws or places 
it on or about the premises or property 
of another, or in any place where 
another may be injured thereby in his 
person or property, is guilty of a 
felony of the second degree." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1953), as amended, 
defines infernal machine as follows: 
-3-
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• "An infernal machine is any box, 
package, contrivance, bomb, or 
apparatus containing or arranged 
with an explosive or acid or poisonous 
or inflamable substance, chemical, or 
compound, or knife, loaded pistol or 
gun, or other dangerous or harmful 
weapon or thing, constructed, contrived, 
or arranged so as to explode, ignite, 
or throw forth its contents, or to 
strike with any of its parts, unexpectedly 
when moved, handled, or opened, or after 
the lapse of time or under conditions 
or in a manner calculated to endanger 
health, life, limb, or property." 
The record amply shows sufficient evidence to 
convict appellant of placing an infernal machine on or 
about the premises or property of another under the above 
statutes. 
The owner of the vehicle which exploded in front 
of his home, Phillip Hartley, testified that after arriving 
home in the early morning on March 12, 1975, he heard a 
muffled explosion (T.19) , that his neighbor telephoned saying 
his house was in a white cloud of smoke, that he observed 
that the back end of his car had been blown up, and that 
he observed a neighbor rendering first aid to appellant who 
had injured his hand and head (T.19-21). 
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Officer Joseph Pfoutz t e s t i f i e d he recovered 
a p p e l l a n t ' s c lo thing and tha t they had a strong odor of 
gasoline (T.42). 
Officer Pat r ick Judd t e s t i f i e d t h a t he inves t iga ted 
the crime scene and observed Officer Ha r t l ey ' s damaged 
vehicle (T.46), i den t i f i ed a piece of l i cense p la te off 
of the rear of the car,found in a neighbor 's yard (T.47), 
observed numbers of foo tpr in t s in t h e v i c i n i t y leading to 
and from the vehic le made by appel lant (T.47-48), observed 
numerous blood splotches and metal fragments in the v i c i n i t y 
(T.47-48), and recovered a piece of fuse obtained by one of 
the neighbors from the crime scene (T.55) . 
Robert Parker, a chemist with the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the United S ta tes Treasury 
Department, t e s t i f i e d tha t he ran a chemical t e s t on the 
fragmented piece of l icense p l a t e and found t r a c e s of n i t r o -
g lycer in , a primary cons t i tuen t of dynamite and double-based 
smokeless powder (T.62)• 
Thomas Fjermestad, an ambulance dr iver who attended 
a p p e l l a n t ' s i n j u r i e s overheard appel lant say, " I got the 
bomb, I saved my b r o t h e r ' s l i fe . 1 1 (T.76) • 
- 5 -
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Ron McNeely, a p p e l l a n t f s b ro the r - in - l aw, 
t e s t i f i e d he was aware appel lant was in possession of 
dynamite approximately one week p r i o r t o the inc ident 
(T.83), tha t he was cal led to the scene to comfort appe l -
lant and t h a t he sa id , "My God, what have I done. Te l l 
Hart ley t h e y ' r e t ry ing to blow up his ca r . " (T.86) . 
During a l a t e r conversation he t e s t i f i e d t h a t appel lan t 
to ld him there were more caps, dynamite, and fuses hidden 
in the insu la t ion of h i s house, which McNeely l a t e r 
located and turned over to the a u t h o r i t i e s (T.88,93) . 
Mr. McNeely a l so r e l a t e d a conversat ion he had with 
appel lant where appellant said tha t the dynamite was 
put in the car and for some reason i t did not go off and 
he went back to take i t out before the time for i t to go 
off, and i t went off with him on i t (T.92) . 
Joan McNeely, a p p e l l a n t ' s s i s t e r , a lso t e s t i f i e d 
that she had a conversation with appel lant a f t e r the 
incident and tha t he said he got the dynamite, put i t i n to 
the ca r , came home, r e a l i z e d what he had done, ran back to 
remove i t , and that i t blew up in his hand (T.102). 
- 6 ~ 
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Appellant t e s t i f e d tha t he placed dynamite 
a t the back bumper of Officer Har t l ey ' s car for the 
purpose of causing damage to the automobile (T.108). 
Two s t i c k s of dynamite# b las t ing caps and a fuse were 
used to make up the bomb ( T . I l l , 112) . The car was 
damaged in the amount of $975.00. Damage was a l so 
done to the house in which Mr. Hartley and h is family 
res ided (T.117) . 
Of most s igni f icance i s the fac t t ha t the re was 
a "lapse of time" of unusual dura t ion between the time 
the fuse was l i t and when i t exploded (T.92,102,117-118) , 
as prescr ibed in Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-3Q6, supra. 
I t is c lear t h a t the evidence i n t h i s case i s 
su f f i c i en t to support the jury verd ic t finding appel lant 
gu i l ty of placing of an in fe rna l machine in v io la t ion of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-307 (1953), a s amended. 
The t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e of review requ i re s the 
Supreme Court of Utah to assume t h a t the jury bel ieved 
the aspects of evidence which support t h e i r ve rd ic t instead 
- 7 -
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of a p p e l l a n t ' s a l l e g a t i o n s . S ta te v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 
71, 498 P.2d 357 (1972). From the t o t a l circumstances i t 
I 
i s the prerogat ive of the jury t o judge the c r e d i b i l i t y 
of the evidence and to determine i t s weight . In so doing, 
in the i n s t a n t case , there i s a reasonable ba s i s the re in I 
from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that appel lant was gu i l ty of placing of an in fe rna l 
4 
machine and this judgment should not be disturbed. 
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964). 
Appellant has not overcome this burden by merely m 
asserting that the evidence should have been interpreted 
by the jury in favor of appellant. 
Many state courts adhere to this general 
principle of law. For example, in State v. McKay, 63 
Nev. 118, 167 P.2d 467 (1946), the Court stated that the 
Supreme Court on the issue of sufficiency of evidence to 
support a verdict, does not weigh evidence but determines 
merely if there is substantial evidence to support the € 
verdict. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Sta te v. Ritson, 215 Kan. 742, 529 P.2d 90 
(1974), the court held tha t in determining suff ic iency 
of evidence the Supreme Court looks only to evidence 
favorable to the decis ion and if e s s e n t i a l elements 
of the charge are sustained by any l ega l ly admitted 
evidence, the conviction w i l l s tand. 
Once the record in t h i s case i s examined i t 
becomes c l ea r tha t there was su f f i c i en t evidence to 
support the v e r d i c t . The r igh t of a jury t r i a l i s a 
r i g h t so fundamental and sacred to the c i t i z e n s t ha t 
i t should be j ea lous ly guarded by the c o u r t s . Never-
t h e l e s s , once t h i s r i g h t has been honored and i t s 
purpose accomplished, the r e su l t i ng verd ic t and judgment 
should be accorded such d ign i ty and respec t as t o give 
i t some s o l i d a r i t y . This requi res t h a t i t not be upset 
unless the re i s e r r o r of su f f i c i en t substance tha t i t 
may have had some mate r ia l e f fec t upon the proceeding 
so t h a t there i s a reasonable l ike l ihood tha t an in ju s t i ce 
r e s u l t e d . Nothing of tha t character has been shown to 
e x i s t here . 
- 9 -
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Respondent r e spec t fu l ly submits t h a t there i s 
su f f i c ien t evidence in th i s case to support the jury 
verd ic t and t h a t decision should be. affirmed. 
POINT I I 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A CHARGE OF ARSON. 
The evidence in this case supports a verdict of 
guilty of placing of an infernal machine in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-307 (1953), as amended, and not 
the violation of the crime of arson. 
Common law, and many present day definitions, 
define arson as the wilful and malicious burning of 
property of another. By definition, some burning is 
essential to the offense. Authorities have differed as 
to the extent and nature of the burning but all require 
"a burning." 
In the instant case, the record is totally 
void of any evidence sufficient to show "a burning" 
which is necessary for the crime of arson. Instead, 
there is only evidence of an explosion in which no fire 
resulted. 
-10-
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In State v. Nielson, 25 Utah 2d 11, 474 P.2d 725 
(1970) , the court held t h a t "a burning11 i s necessary to 
c o n s t i t u t e the crime of arson. 
In State v . Washington, 5 Or.App. 347, 483 P.2d 
465 (1971), the court held tha t the corpus de lec t i .o f arson 
i s tha t a "building burned11 as a r e s u l t of the cr iminal 
a c t i v i t y of some person. 
In Ex pa r t e Bramble, 31 C.2d 43, 187 P.2d 411 
(1947) , the court s t a t e d t h a t "at common law 'arson1 was 
the wi l fu l and malicious burning of the dwelling house of 
another, but arson has been extended by s t a t u t e t o include 
many a c t s of burning not involving spec ia l danger to the 
person." 
In 1973, the Utah Legis la ture enacted Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-102 (195 3 ) , as amended. This s t a t u t e repealed 
the p r io r exis t ing arson s t a t u t e . 
The bas ic change i s t h a t the arson s t a t u t e was 
expanded to include explosives and var ious types of 
proper ty . This expansion of the arson laws cannot be 
construed as abol ishing the necessary requirement of 
- 1 1 -
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i 
"a burning." The in ten t of the l e g i s l a t u r e was t o expand 
the code to cover various methods in which property i s 
burned. ^ 
Other s t a t e s have s imilar s t a t u t e s . In Section 
13-234 of the Arizona Revised S t a tu t e s Annotated, i t i s 
i 
c l ea r ly se t out t h a t the explosives must be used with an 
i n t en t to produce "a burning." 
"§ 13-234. Arson in the fourth i 
degree; d e f i n i t i o n ; punishment. 
A. A person who w i l f u l l y and 
mal ic iously at tempts to set f i r e to 
or attempts to burn or to a i d , counsel 
or procure the burning of bu i ld ings I 
or property mentioned in §§ 13-231, 
13-232 and 13-233, or who commits any 
act preliminary t he r e to or in fu r the r -
ance thereof, i s g u i l t y of arson in the 
fourth degree, and s h a l l be punished ^ 
by imprisonment in the s t a t e prison 
for not l e s s than one nor more than 
two years , or by a f ine not exceeding 
one thousand d o l l a r s . 
B. The placing or d i s t r i b u t i n g of 
flammable, explosive or combustible ' 
mater ia l or substance, or any device 
in any bui lding or proper ty mentioned 
in §§ 13-231, 13-232, and 13-233 in an 
arrangement or p repara t ion with i n t e n t to 
eventual ly w i l fu l l y and maliciously se t € 
f i r e to or burn such bui lding or proper ty , 
- 12 - i 
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or t o p r o c u r e t h e s e t t i n g f i r e t o 
or b u r n i n g o f s u c h b u i l d i n g o r 
p r o p e r t y , s h a l l , f o r t h e p u r p o s e s 
of t h i s a r t i c l e , c o n s t i t u t e an 
a t t e m p t t o b u r n such b u i l d i n g o r 
p r o p e r t y * 
Responden t s u b m i t s t h a t t h i s i s t h e p r o p e r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e a r s o n s t a t u t e s . The Utah L e g i s l a t u r e , 
r e c o g n i z i n g t h e n e e d , e n a c t e d a s e p a r a t e s t a t u t e c o v e r i n g 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g e x p l o s i v e s wh ich do n o t 
i n v o l v e "a b u r n i n g . " Tha t s t a t u t e i s S e c t i o n 7 6 - 1 0 - 3 0 7 , 
s u p r a , unde r which a p p e l l a n t was found g u i l t y o f p l a c i n g 
o f an i n f e r n a l m a c h i n e . 
R e s p o n d e n t r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t s t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s 
e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n and due p r o c e s s a rgument i n P o i n t I I I o f 
a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f i s t o t a l l y w i t h o u t m e r i t b e c a u s e t h e 
e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y s u p p o r t s a c h a r g e a n d c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e 
o f f e n s e of p l a c i n g of a n i n f e r n a l mach ine and n o t t h a t of 
a r s o n . 
POINT I I I 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBERS 4 AND 
5 ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN COURT. 
- 1 3 -
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Appellant requested jury i n s t r u c t i o n numbers 4 
and 5, which read as fol lows: 
" Ins t ruc t ion No* 4 . I f you have 
a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
Sta te has es tab l i shed each and every 
element necessary to convict the 
defendant of the crime of Delivery 
of an Infernal Machine, you should 
next consider whether the defendant 
i s g u i l t y of the crime of arson." 
" Ins t ruc t ion No. 5 . To warrant 
you in finding the defendant gu i l t y 
of the Crime of Arson, you must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt t h a t the 
defendant: 
1) I n t e n t i o n a l l y damaged the 
property of another ; 
2) T h a t s a i d damage was done by 
u s e o f f i r e o r e x p l o s i v e ; a n d 
3) T h a t s a i d a c t s o c c u r r e d i n 
Wash ing ton C o u n t y , S t a t e o f U t a h . " 
The s t a n d a r d i n Utah i s t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n s must 
b e a r a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e e v i d e n c e a d m i t t e d i n c o u r t . 
S t a t e v . P a c h e c o , 27 Utah 2d 2 8 1 , 495 P . 2 d 408 (1972) . 
I n s t r u c t i o n s r e q u e s t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t do not meet 
t h i s s t a n d a r d . As s t a t e d i n G r i n d s t a f f v . S t a t e , 165 
P a c . 2 d 846 (Ok l . . C r . , 1 9 4 6 ) , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must i n s t r u c t 
- 1 4 -
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the jury fully on all questions of law developed by 
the evidence but the court is not required to instruct 
upon some imaginary theory of defense not supported by 
the evidence. 
Appellant requested instruction number 3 
which reads as follows: 
"Instruction No. 3. An infernal 
machine is defined as follows: any 
box, package, contrivance, bomb, or 
apparatus containing or arranged with 
an explosive or acid or poisonous or 
inflammable substance, chemical, or 
compound, or knife, loaded pistol, or 
gun, or other dangerous or harmful 
weapon or thing, constructed, contrived, 
or arranged so as to explode, ignite, 
or throw forth its contents, or to 
strike with any of its parts, unexpectedly 
when moved, handled, or opened, or after 
the lapse of time or under conditions or 
in a manner calculated to endanger health, 
life, limb, or property." 
The substance of this instruction was given by 
the trial court in instruction number 15. It is not error 
to refuse to give requested instructions where the subject 
matter thereof is fully and fairly covered by other 
instructions given. State v. Larsen, 76 Id. 528, 286 P.2d 
646 (1955). 
-15-
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T h e r e f o r e / t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l of a p p e l l a n t ' s 
r e q u e s t e d i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of w h i c h 
was f u l l y c o v e r e d by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n ( I n s t r u c t i o n 
No, 15) , was t o t a l l y j u s t i f i e d and w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e -
t i o n . S t a t e v . W i l l i a m s , 49 Wash.2d 354 , 301 P . 2 d 769 
( 1 9 5 6 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
T h i s c a s e s h o u l d b e a f f i r m e d f o r t h e r e a s o n 
t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e a d d u c e d a t t r i a l was d e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t 
t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g o f g u i l t y o f p l a c i n g an i n f e r n a l 
m a c h i n e . "A b u r n i n g " h a s commonly b e e n h e l d t o be a 
v i t a l e l e m e n t of A r s o n i n such s t a t u t e s . T h i s e l e m e n t 
d o e s no t e x i s t , i n f a c t , i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . 
The t r i a l c o u r t i s u n d e r no o b l i g a t i o n t o 
g i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t a l l y i m a g i n a r y by t h e d e f e n s e and 
u n s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . From t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e r e 
i s no u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o which s t a t u t e s h o u l d a p p l y ; 
t h e r e f o r e , a p p e l l a n t ' s d u e p r o c e s s a r g u m e n t i s w i t h o u t 
m e r i t . 
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For t h e s e r e a s o n s , 
s u b m i t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
a f f i r m e d . " 
r e s p o n d e n t r e s p e c t f u l l y 
d e c i s i o n s h o u l d b e 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B . ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL P . DORIUS 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y Genera 
A t t o r n e y s f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
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